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Abstract 
Our movement kinematics provide useful cues about our affective states. Given that our experiences 
furnish models that help us to interpret our environment, and that a rich source of action experience 
comes from our own movements, the present study examined whether we use models of our own 
action kinematics to make judgments about the affective states of others. For example, relative to 
one’s typical kinematics, anger is associated with fast movements. Therefore, the extent to which we 
perceive anger in others may be determined by the degree to which their movements are faster than 
our own typical movements. We related participants’ walking kinematics in a neutral context to their 
judgments of the affective states conveyed by observed point-light walkers (PLWs). As predicted, we 
found a linear relationship between one’s own walking kinematics and affective state judgments, such 
that faster participants rated slower emotions more intensely relative to their ratings for faster 
emotions. This relationship was absent when observing PLWs where differences in velocity between 
affective states were removed. These findings suggest that perception of affective states in others is 
predicted by one’s own movement kinematics, with important implications for perception of, and 
interaction with, those who move differently. 
Keywords: Action perception; emotion; affective states; point-light walkers; expertise 
Public significance statement: The way that we move provides useful cues about our 
emotions. For example, we move more quickly than our average speed when we are feeling angry and 
more slowly when we are feeling sad. The present study shows that we make judgments about others’ 
emotional expressions relative to how we move ourselves. To give an example, rather than everyone 
interpreting movements of a certain speed as angry, individuals may only think that others feel angry 
if these movements are faster than their own typical movement speed. Therefore, we are better placed 
to understand the emotions of others who tend to move more similarly to us. These findings have 
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important implications for our understanding of and interactions with clinical and cultural groups 
whose movements are dramatically different from our own. 
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1. Introduction  
Behavioral expressions of affective states are often automatic and exhibit many similarities across 
individuals (Frijda, 2010). These similarities allow recognition of affective states in others from a 
range of cultures (e.g., Sauter, Eisner, Ekman, & Scott, 2010). Various cues provide information 
about our affective states, such as facial expressions (Bassili, 1979; Ekman & Friesen, 1975), 
vocalisations (Scherer, 1995), and importantly, the way that we move (Dael, Mortillaro, & Scherer, 
2012). For example, anger is associated with fast movement (Ada, Suda, & Ishii, 2003; Montepare, 
Goldstein, & Clausen, 1987; Roether, Omlor, Christensen, & Giese, 2009a) and sadness with low 
velocity (Michalak et al., 2009; Pollick, Paterson, Bruderlin, & Sanford, 2001; some [Ada et al., 
2003], but not all [Barliya, Omlor, Giese, Berthoz, & Flash, 2013] studies also find that happiness is 
associated with high velocity). Therefore, in the same way that perception of a smile prompts the 
attribution of happiness, perception of fast movements can prompt the attribution of anger (Atkinson, 
Tunstall, & Dittrich, 2007; Roether et al., 2009a; Roether, Omlor, & Giese, 2009b). The association of 
specific movement cues with specific affective states can provide a rapid route for the attribution of 
affective states to others, enabling fast and appropriate responses to others’ behavior (Brown & 
Brüne, 2012; Klin, Jones, Schults, &Volkmar, 2003; Sartori, Cavallo, Bucchioni, & Castiello, 2012).  
It is likely that we are able to make these affective state inferences through models built on the basis 
of experience of our own movements. Our experiences with the world tune our perceptual systems 
(Blakemore & Cooper, 1970; Sangrigoli, Pallier, Argenti, Ventureyra, & De Schonen, 2005) and we 
have extensive experience with our own actions as we learn to control them (Rochat, 1998; Van der 
Meer, Van der Weel, & Lee, 1995). This experience, both through direct visual tuning from self-
observation and motor contributions to perception (Calvo-Merino, Grèzes, Glaser, Passingham, & 
Haggard, 2006; Gerson, Bekkering, & Hunnius, 2014; Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014), may tune our 
perceptual models of action according to how we move. For example, it has been proposed that mirror 
mechanisms – mechanisms that generate activation of corresponding motor codes when passively 
observing action – may influence action perception (Witt, South, & Sugovic, 2014). This framework 
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could explain findings whereby one’s own actions determine perception of related stimuli (Jordan & 
Hunsinger, 2008).  
The present study tests for the first time whether participants’ models of their own movements 
influence their interpretation of the emotions of others. This hypothesis predicts differences in 
affective state perception between participants who move with distinct kinematics. For example, we 
may all increase our velocity when we feel angry, and reduce our velocity when we feel sad. 
However, a ‘fast mover’ – who typically moves faster than an average person – will move particularly 
quickly when they are angry, but when feeling sad their speed might be more comparable to that of an 
average person who is not experiencing any strong emotional state (Figure 1A). If this ‘fast mover’ is 
using a model of their own kinematics to interpret others’ affective states, another’s fast movements 
(conveying anger) are unlikely to be perceived as intensely angry (see Figure 1Aii) because they are 
comparable to the fast mover’s own typical movements. However, this person will perceive sad 
(slow) movements as intensely sad, because these movements are very different from how they 
typically move. Conversely, someone who moves more slowly than average would perceive fast 
(angry) movements as more intensely emotional relative to slow (sad) movements (See Figure 1Ai).  
Variability in participants’ own typical kinematics was assessed by recording velocity while walking 
in a neutral context. In addition, participants viewed emotional (angry, happy or sad) point-light 
walker stimuli (PLW, see Figure 1B). The kinematics of these stimuli were either affect-specific (e.g., 
high velocity for angry walkers), or manipulated to converge to neutral kinematics (see Figure 1C). 
Participants were asked to rate the extent to which the PLW appeared happy, angry and sad. We 
predicted that we would find a linear relationship between one’s own walking kinematics and 
affective state judgments of others, such that the faster participants would rate the slower emotions 
more intensely relative to the faster emotions. We predicted attenuation of this relationship as the 
differences in kinematics between affective states were removed. Findings of this nature would 
indicate that our perception of others’ affective cues is determined by our own action models.  
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2. Method 
2.1 Participants 
This study was first conducted with 41 participants (17 males, aged 20-43 years, M=27.37, 
SEM=1.04) recruited from the local university database and the effects reported below were present in 
this initial group (see Supplementary Materials). It was subsequently deemed prudent to increase the 
sample to 87 (40 males, aged 18-62 years, M=29.48, SEM=1.00) to ensure that effects were not due to 
sampling error and the effects were replicated in the 46 new participants (see Supplementary 
Materials). Given that the precision of effect size estimation depends primarily on sample size 
(Maxwell, Kelley, & Rausch, 2008; Asendorpf et al., 2013) we pooled the participants for optimal 
sensitivity, and determined the robustness of the effect with bootstrapping analyses (see 
Supplementary Materials). There were no multivariate outliers. All participants gave informed 
consent, and procedures received local ethical approval.  
2.2 Stimuli 
The stimuli were PLWs (Figure 1B) adapted from those developed by Nackaerts et al. (2012). The 
original PLWs depicted a male or female actor expressing happy, sad, angry or neutral affective 
states, in two different viewpoints (coronal [0°] and intermediate to coronal and sagittal [45°]). 
To confirm that kinematic information is used to make affective state judgments, and examine how 
this use varies according to one’s own kinematics, we also generated three velocity adapted 
animations corresponding to each original emotional animation (original animations are referred to 
hereafter as 100% emotion stimuli). The 0% animations exhibited a mean velocity equal to the mean 
velocity of the corresponding neutral animation, and 33% and 67% animations exhibited velocities 
between the neutral and 100% emotional stimuli (Figure 1C). These manipulations resulted in 48 
emotion stimuli.  
7 
 
Two random frames from each neutral walker frame-set were also selected, resulting in eight static 
control images which contained no affective information – postures were neutral and there was no 
kinematic information. 
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Figure 1: A) Schematic diagram of the experimental hypothesis. The left panel (Ai) depicts the kinematics of fast, 
average, and slow walkers when sad. The right panel (Aii) depicts the kinematics of fast, average, and slow walkers 
when angry. Note that at the velocity highlighted by the arrow in the left panel, a slow walker is feeling no particular 
emotion, but a fast walker is feeling intensely sad. B) Example frames taken from the happy intermediate (45°) male 
PLW. In these PLWs, 12 points reflect the motion at important joints in the body (see Supplementary Videos for 
examples). C) The velocity of the original (100%) animations was altered to assess the extent to which kinematic 
information is used to make affective state judgments. 0% stimuli exhibited velocities equal to the neutral stimuli (e.g. 
the 0% happy male coronal velocity was equal to that in the neutral male coronal animation), and 33% and 67% 
animations exhibited velocities between the neutral and 100% emotion stimuli. 
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2.3.1 Procedure 
All participants first completed emotion perception tasks with the original PLWs, then the velocity 
adapted PLWs, and finally the static control images. Participants subsequently performed the walking 
task and completed the questionnaire measures1.  
2.3.2 Emotion perception tasks 
On each trial, the participants were presented with a PLW and asked to rate the extent to which the 
walker was expressing one of the three target emotions: happy, angry or sad. The rating scale ranged 
from ‘not at all (happy, angry, sad)’ to ‘very (happy, angry, sad)’. Participants clicked on a visual 
analogue scale, and responses were recorded on a 0-10 scale (to two decimal places; value not shown 
to participants). The initial position of the cursor was randomized for each trial. Participants could 
change their response until they pressed a key to continue. The affective state judgment to be made 
was blocked, resulting in three separate blocks (happy, angry and sad judgments). All stimuli were 
presented once in each block, and the order of the blocks was counterbalanced across participants. In 
addition, the order of presentation of the stimuli was randomized for each participant within each 
block. Before beginning the study the participants had three practice trials. In each practice trial 
participants were asked to rate one of the three emotions and were shown a randomly selected 100% 
emotional sagittal PLW.  
The procedure was the same when viewing the static control images. On each trial within each of the 
three blocks, one of eight images was presented for 2.04 seconds (mean duration of the animations). 
These stimuli were used to measure response bias (see Supplementary Materials).  
                                                          
1A fixed order was selected to enable comparability between the testing conditions for all participants and allow 
the study of individual differences. It was deemed that the walking task should always be performed after the 
emotion perception tasks to minimize the risk that participants were primed to make explicit reference to their 
own walking pace during the perception tasks. 
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In the test phase participants were therefore asked to make a total of 48 ratings of the original PLWs, 
then 108 ratings of the velocity adapted emotional PLWs, and 24 ratings of the static control images.  
2.3.3 Walking task and questionnaires  
Participants were instructed to walk continuously between two cones (10 meters apart) at their own 
typical walking pace and that they would be told when to stop (after 120 seconds). An iPhone 5c was 
attached to the medial side of the participants’ right ankle, and the internal accelerometer was used to 
track the precise time taken and distance travelled for each participant, via the Sensor Kinetics Pro© 
application. For pre-processing of the walking task data see Supplementary Materials.  
To assess any response biases associated with mood (Forgas, 1995; Fiedler, Nickel, Muehlefriedel, & 
Unkelback, 2000), all participants rated their current mood (happy, angry and sad) using the same 
scale as that used in the emotion tasks, from ‘not at all (happy, angry, sad)’ to ‘very (happy, angry, 
sad)’. Sixty-six of the participants also completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule-
Expanded form (PANAS-X, Watson & Clark, 1994) to assess trait General Positive and General 
Negative Affect.  
3. Results  
3.1.1 Emotion perception measures  
We calculated ‘emotional intensity scores’ (EIS) for each emotion and velocity level (3 emotions x 4 
levels). These measures were calculated as the mean rating on the modeled emotion scale (e.g., angry 
for the 0%, 33%, 67% and 100% angry stimuli) minus the mean of the two ratings on the non-
modeled emotion scales (happy and sad in this case; the subtraction was performed to isolate 
participants’ rating of the modeled emotion from the non-modeled emotions). High EIS scores 
indicate that participants judged the PLW as intensely expressing the modeled emotion, while low (or 
negative) scores indicate that the PLW is judged as weakly expressing the modeled emotion or 
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expressing a non-modeled emotion. Group-level analyses of performance across different stimulus 
types are presented within the Supplementary Materials.  
We then calculated composite emotional intensity beta scores (EIBS). The EIBS represent the linear 
relationship in intensity scores from the slowest (sad) to the fastest (angry) emotions (via happy). This 
score was calculated by modeling the regression slope (β) between animation kinematics and EIS, 
such that the predictor values were the mean velocity of the PLWs’ right ankle for each of the three 
modeled emotions in the 100% emotion stimuli (see Figure 2A), and the dependent values were the 
corresponding EIS. A positive EIBS denotes higher intensity ratings for the faster relative to the 
slower emotions and a negative score represents higher intensity ratings for the slower emotions.  
3.1.2 Relationship between walking kinematics and emotion perception  
To test our primary hypothesis, we performed a Pearson Product Moment Correlation to examine 
whether individual differences in walking velocity were related to emotion perception, measured by 
our 100% EIBS. In line with our hypotheses, we found a negative relationship (r = -.310, N=87, 
p=.003, 95% CI [-.489, -.106]; see Figure 2B) such that participants whose walking kinematics were 
faster rated the slower emotions more intensely relative to the faster emotions. 
To test whether the kinematic cues in the PLWs mediated this effect, we examined whether a similar 
correlation was present between the 0% EIBS (animations with emotional postural information, but 
no emotion specific kinematic cues) and walking velocity. There was no relationship between these 
variables (r=-.025, N=87, p=.820, 95% CI [-.234, .187]; Steiger test comparing 0% and 100% EIBS 
correlation coefficients: z=-2.38, p=.017; see Figure 2C), indicating that the emotion specific velocity 
cues are important for the observed relationship between walking velocity and emotion perception. 
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Finally, to ensure that mood did not mediate the observed relationships between walking kinematics 
and emotional perception we performed partial correlations, controlling for variability relating to 
mood. The analysis controlling for participant’s state mood ratings (happy, sad and angry) showed the 
same negative correlations as reported above (100% EIBS: r=-.305, N=87, p=.005, 95% CI [-.485, -
.101], as did that controlling for General Negativity and Positivity on the PANAS-X, in the sub-
sample for whom we had these scores (r=-.337, N=66, p=.006, 95% CI [-.535, -.103]).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: A) Mean ankle velocity for animations in each affective category. Error bars represent SEM in 
both panels. B) Scatter plot of the negative correlation between the 100% EIBS and the participants’ own 
walking velocity. A high 100% EIBS represents participants rating the faster emotions (anger) as more 
intense relative to the slower emotions (sadness). C) Scatter plot demonstrating no relationship between the 
0% EIBS and participants’ own walking velocity.  
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4. Discussion 
This study examined whether an individual’s own movement kinematics predict the perception of 
others’ affective states. In line with our predictions, we found that participants who walked with 
greater speed rated high velocity (angry) emotions as less intense relative to low velocity (sad) 
emotions. This association was abolished when the kinematic information relating to affective state 
was removed, and could not be explained by variance related to participants’ state or trait mood.  
Such findings provide novel evidence that attributions about others’ covert affective states are 
calibrated to one’s own action experiences. Passive action observation has been found to generate 
activation of corresponding motor codes, which may contribute to perception (e.g., Witt, South, & 
Sugovic, 2014). Observation of walking may therefore be assumed to activate codes for walking at 
that velocity oneself, and attribution of an affective state to the observed other may be determined by 
the speed of these codes relative to one’s own typical pace. The precise nature of the general 
mechanism that links action and perception is a matter of debate, and a variety of versions of an ‘own 
action calibration’ mechanism could generate our effects. For example, the effects may be a product 
of visual tuning of perceptual models during production of our own actions (Peelen & Dowling, 
2007), or may rely upon motor contributions to perception that are not exclusive to observation of 
actions per se (Press & Cook, 2015).     
The present findings have important implications for our understanding of affect perception between 
different populations. The current study predicts that social interactions should be most successful 
between interaction partners who move similarly, as greater understanding of others’ internal states is 
likely to result in more successful social interactions. For example, differences in the production of 
actions may impact cross-cultural affect perception (Hareli, Kafetsios, & Hess, 2015; Matsumoto, 
Seung Hee Yoo, & Fontaine, 2008; Quiros-Ramirez & Onisawa, 2015). Consistent with this 
speculation, individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), who have a range of social and 
communicative impairments, have been shown to move with atypical action kinematics compared to 
14 
 
typical individuals, and individuals with the most atypical kinematics are also those with the most 
severe social difficulties (Cook, Blakemore, & Press, 2013; Cook, 2016; see also Edey et al., 2016). 
The speculation that social interaction may be impaired between interactants who move dissimilarly, 
might in part explain a range of social interaction difficulties across various clinical groups associated 
with motor atypicalities (e.g., ADHD, Tervo, Azuma, Forgas, & Fiechtner, 2007 and cerebella ataxia 
D’Agata et al., 2011).   
In conclusion, the present findings suggest that we use models of our own movement kinematics to 
make affective judgments about others. This finding may have important implications for perception 
of, and interaction with those who move differently. 
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